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INFO RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 2273
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RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 8247
RUMJNG/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 2376
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TOKYO FOR PELLETREAU

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CASC, EWWT, PREL, VM, FR, AS, US
SUBJECT: AMERICAN VESSEL APPREHENDED BY VIETNAMESE

/ REF: STATE 380057

1. ON DECEMBER 26, 1984, REPRESENTATIVES SOLARZ AND TORRICELLI GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE IN BANGKOK IN WHICH THEY REFERRED BRIEFLY TO DISCUSSIONS WITH SRV FM NGUYEN CO THACH ON THE SUBJECT OF WILLIAM MATHERS AND THE "SO FONG". THEY STATED THAT THACH TOLD THEM THE MATHERS AFFAIR WAS NOT IN THE HANDS OF THE MFA BUT THAT IT WAS NEVERTHELESS A "MINOR MATTER" WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BE RESOLVED SOON. THACH ASSURED THE CONGRESSMEN THAT RELEASE WOULD BE FORTHCOMING AND THAT "SOME OF THE LEGAL STEPS HAVE ALREADY BEEN TAKEN TO RELEASE HIM". THACH DID NOT SPECIFY IN WHOSE HANDS THE MATTER NOW RESTED NOR DID HE OFFER ANY TIME FRAME IN WHICH TO EXPECT RELEASE OF EITHER MATHERS OR THE "SO FONG".
 2. IN POST'S EXPERIENCE, THACH'S ADVICE TO THE CONGRESSMEN REPRESENTS NOTHING NEW ON THE MATHERS CASE NOR DOES IT DIFFER DRAMATICALLY FROM RHETORIC PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. DEAN
- END OF MESSAGE

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E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: CARR, CASC, VM (MATHERS, WILLIAM)
SUBJECT: AMERICAN VESSEL APPREHENDED BY VIETNAM:
LATEST AUSTRALIAN EFFORTS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY CALLED DEPARTMENT DECEMBER 27 TO BRIEF US ON THE MOST RECENT EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF AMCIT WILLIAM MATHERS BY THE AUSTRALIAN CHARGE IN HANOI. ON DECEMBER 22, CHARGE SCOBLE CALLED ON LUONG VAN LY OF THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS SECTION OF HO CHI MINH CITY (HCMC) WHO DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS BEING IN CHARGE OF THE MATHERS CASE. SCOBLE WAS TOLD THAT THE VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS WITH WHOM THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY HAD DEALT CONCERNING FLECKER WERE NOT AVAILABLE.

3. POSSIBLE RELEASE: LY REFUSED TO COMMENT TO SCOBLE ON THE STATUS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF MATHERS AND GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THE CASE MIGHT BE RESOLVED SHORTLY. COMMENT: ~~WE NOTED THE REPORT IN THE NEW YORK TIMES~~ QUOTING ~~CONGRESSMAN SCOBLE~~ AS HAVING BEEN "HOPEFUL" AFTER HIS VISIT TO HANOI. END COMMENT.

4. PACKAGES: NEITHER EMBASSY BANGKOK'S "CARE" PACKAGE NOR THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY SUGGESTION TO PUT ONE TOGETHER OUT OF MATERIAL AT HAND REACHED HANOI BEFORE SCOBLE'S DEPARTURE FOR HCMC. TWO LETTERS ADDRESSED TO MATHERS, ONE FROM PER BANG-JENSEN AND A GREETING CARD SIGNED BY 42 OF MATHERS' FRIENDS IN SINGAPORE, HAD ARRIVED AND SCOBLE ATTEMPTED TO DELIVER THEM THROUGH LY. LY, HOWEVER, REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE LETTERS, SAYING THAT ANYTHING INTENDED FOR MATHERS HAD TO BE GIVEN TO MFA IN HANOI. WHEN SCOBLE ASKED ABOUT THE EARLIER PACKAGE FOR MATHERS, LY REPLIED THAT IT HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO THE CAN THO AUTHORITIES TWO WEEKS AGO AND THAT IT WAS UP TO THEM TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO GIVE IT TO MATHERS.

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5. VISIT: SCOBLE NOTED THAT HE HAD REQUESTED PERMISSION FROM MFA IN HANOI TO TRAVEL TO CAN THO TO SEE MATHERS BUT HAD RECEIVED NO RESPONSE, WONDERING WHETHER LY HAD RECEIVED ANY WORD. LY REPLIED THAT SINCE HANOI HAD NOT AUTHORIZED SCOBLE TO VISIT CAN THO, HE COULD NOT AUTHORIZE SUCH A VISIT.

6. CONSULAR ACCESS: SCOBLE SAID THAT AUSTRALIA DID NOT INTEND TO ASSUME FULL CONSULAR RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE MATHERS CASE BUT WAS PREPARED TO OFFER ITS GOOD OFFICES TO TEND TO MATHERS' PERSONAL NEEDS. LY REPLIED THAT THE AMERICAN AND VIETNAMESE EMBASSIES IN BANGKOK WERE IN INFORMAL CONTACT ON THESE MATTERS. HE SAID THAT THE SINGLE MOST COMPLICATING FACTOR IN THE CASE WAS THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NEVER COMMUNICATED OFFICIALLY WITH VIETNAM TO DEAL WITH THE SRV ON THIS CASE. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE SAID, THE U.S. HAD NEVER REQUESTED PERMISSION FOR ONE OF ITS OWN CONSULS TO SEE MATHERS. LY SAID THAT SUCH A REQUEST WOULD RECEIVE FULL CONSIDERATION BUT HE COULD NOT PROMISE THAT IT WOULD BE APPROVED. IT WOULD BE USELESS, HE SAID, FOR AUSTRALIA TO SEEK A ROLE FOR ITSELF UNLESS GIVEN FULL CONSULAR POWER BY THE U.S. IN A WAY COMMUNICATED OFFICIALLY TO VIETNAM. SCOBLE OBSERVED THAT LY WAS BEING "UNNECESSARILY PROTOCOLAIR" IN THIS MATTER, BUT LY DID NOT RESPOND.

7. ACTION REQUESTED BANGKOK: "THE NEW YORK TIMES," IN A DECEMBER 27 STORY ON CODEL SOLARZ, REPORTED IN PART: "IN VIETNAM, THE CONGRESSMEN, THEY WERE GIVEN REASON TO BE HOPEFUL THAT HANOI WOULD RELEASE AN AMERICAN YACHTSMAN, WILLIAM M. MATHERS, WHOSE PARENTS LIVE IN LOCUST VALLEY, L.I. MR MATHERS WAS SAILING HIS CRAFT

NEAR VIETNAMESE WATERS WHEN HE WAS DETAINED IN JULY." DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION POST MAY HAVE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF REPRESENTATIVES SOLARZ'S AND TORRICELLI'S CONVERSATIONS WITH THE VIETNAMESE. DAM
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PREL, IN, PK
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO GOI ON AL-ZULFIQAR

REF: STATE 342485

1. REFTEL LEFT TO MY DISCRETION THE TIMING OF AN APPROACH TO KAO'S REPLACEMENT AND TO P.C. ALEXANDER ON INDIAN SUPPORT FOR AL-ZULFIQAR. KAO HAS NOT BEEN REPLACED, SO I DECIDED TO TALK TO ALEXANDER THIS WEEK. ~~SINCE VISITING CONGRESSIONAL SENATOR~~ WITH MY O.K., IN HIS PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH ALEXANDER DECEMBER 17 ALLUDED TO HIS CONCERN OVER REPORTS HE HAD HEARD ABOUT SUCH SUPPORT, THIS GAVE ME A GOOD PEG ON WHICH TO HANG MY APPROACH.

2. I BEGAN BY RECALLING SOLARZ' CONCERN AND SAID I WANTED TO GIVE ALEXANDER A SPECIFIC INSTANCE OF WHY THAT CONCERN SHOULD EXIST. I THEN CITED THE ARREST OF AL-ZULFIQAR TERRORISTS IN VIENNA AS THEY WERE PREPARING TO SEIZE AMERICAN HOSTAGES AND ADDED THAT SOME OF THE MEMBERS OF THE GROUP HAD BEEN TRAINED IN INDIA. I THEN NOTED THAT THIS WAS THE SECOND INSTANCE OF AL-ZULFIQAR TARGETING AMERICANS AND SAID WE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW ANY SUPPORT OF THIS SORT OF ACTIVITY WAS CONSISTENT WITH WHAT WE UNDERSTOOD TO BE STRONG GOI OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM.

3. ALEXANDER SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO GET INTO A DETAILED DISCUSSION ON THIS TOPIC BECAUSE HE WAS ALREADY LATE FOR A MEETING HE WAS TO CONDUCT; BUT HE DID SAY AS AN INITIAL COMMENT THAT HE WONDERED ABOUT THE U.S. MAKING THIS SORT OF CHARGE WHEN THE U.S. WAS PROVIDING SUPPORT TO PAKISTAN AND PAKISTAN FOR ITS PART SENT TERRORISTS INTO INDIA.

4. I SAID WE SHOULD PICK UP THE SUBJECT AGAIN BUT FOR THE MOMENT I WANTED TO BE SURE HE RECOGNIZED THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE TOOK THIS SORT OF INFORMATION WHICH WE COULD NOT AFFORD TO IGNORE

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AS WELL AS THE SERIOUSNESS WE ACCORDED TO OUR
RELATIONS WITH INDIA WHICH WAS WHY I SAID WHAT I
DID AND WHY THE CONGRESSMAN HAD ALLUDED TO IT.

5. COMMENT - I HAD EXPECTED TO HAVE MORE TIME
WITH ALEXANDER, SO IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE
IMPACT OF WHAT I HAD TO SAY. ASIDE FROM HIS ONE
COMMENT, HE LISTENED VERY CAREFULLY.

BARNES

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 INFO RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 5636
 RUSBAY/AMCONSUL BOMBAY 6070
 RUEHMR/AMCONSUL MADRAS 4742
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4755
 RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0323
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E.O. 12356: DECL: 12/21/90
 TAGS: PGOV, IN
 SUBJECT: HARDGRAVE BOOK AND TRAVEL

REF: (A) STATE 37185, (B) STATE 373309

1. PRIME MINISTER GANDHI'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARY P.C. ALEXANDER TOLD AMBASSADOR DECEMBER 20 THAT HE FELT THE POTENTIAL CONTROVERSY OVER AN AMERICAN SCHOLAR'S (ROBERT HARDGRAVE'S) STUDY HAD "BLOWN OVER" THANKS TO THE FACTUAL REFUTATION THE EMBASSY HAD PUT OUT. (ALEXANDER HAD SAID DECEMBER 17 WHEN HE MET CONGRESSMAN SOLARE THAT HE FEARED THE EPISODE MIGHT "BLOW UP" AND DAMAGE U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS BECAUSE THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT STUDY WAS BEING DEPICTED AS SOMEHOW LINKED TO PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI'S ASSASSINATION). ALEXANDER ALSO NOTED THAT HARDGRAVE HAS A VERY GOOD REPUTATION HERE AS A FRIEND OF INDIA.

2. THREE MAJOR INDIAN NEWSPAPERS DECEMBER 21 - THE NATIONALLY-CIRCULATED "INDIAN EXPRESS," THE RESPECTED "STATESMAN" OF CALCUTTA AND NEW DELHI, AND THE INFLUENTIAL "HINDUSTANI TIMES" OF NEW DELHI STRONGLY DEFENDED THE HARDGRAVE BOOK AS A LEGITIMATE ACADEMIC STUDY RATHER THAN AS A "SINISTER" STATE DEPARTMENT EFFORT AS CLAIMED BY THE PRO-MOSCOW "PATRIOT" (FOR DETAILS SEE NEW DELHI MEDIA REACTION REPORT NUMBER 183 OF DECEMBER 21).

3. ASIDE FROM RAJIV GANDHI'S PASSING REFERENCE TO THE BOOK, IT MAY BE SIGNIFICANT THAT, DESPITE THE TEMPTATION OFFERED BY THE ELECTIONS, THE GOI HAS CONSCIOUSLY AVOIDED SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED BY THE HARDGRAVE BOOK AND THE BHOPAL DISASTER TO LAMBASTE THE U.S. THE ONLY OTHER POSSIBLE EXCEPTION IS THE APPEARANCE ON PANEL SHOWS ON TWO SUCCESSIVE EVENINGS ON THE STATE RUN TV OF THE EDITOR OF THE "PATRIOT" R. K. MISHRA, WHO USED THE OCCASION TO PUSH HIS "THEME. BARNES

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INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8367
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 7766

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IN, US
SUBJECT: U.S. - INDIAN RELATIONS

1. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE VISITS OF CEBELS MAN AND PELL, AND IMPENDING PRIVATE VISITS OF BRZEZINSKI AND KISSINGER, HAVE EVIDENTLY CAUGHT THE ATTENTION OF INDIAN OFFICIALS HERE, WHOSE QUESTIONS ON THE SUBJECT GIVE FURTHER EVIDENCE OF INDIAN SENSITIVITY TO THEIR "SPECIAL" STATUS IN THE AREA.

3. AT A PRIVATE DINNER FOR THE WEIL FAMILY AT THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE ON DECEMBER 19, IT WAS MENTIONED THAT IF A CERTAIN SENATOR, WHO AT THE MOMENT WAS IN INDIA, VISITED NEPAL, IT WOULD BE THE SIXTH SUCH VISIT IN RECENT WEEKS. I REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH VISIT PLANNED AND THAT STEPHEN SOLARZ (WHO I SURMISED WAS THE PERSON REFERRED TO) WAS A CONGRESSMAN NOT A SENATOR. DURING THE COURSE OF THE EVENING, AMBASSADOR SARIN WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO LAMENT THE STATE OF U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS AND TO POINT OUT THAT HISTORICALLY AND CULTURALLY INDIA IS MORE DRAWN TO THE WEST THAN TO RUSSIA. HE STATED THAT THE MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA WAS ESTABLISHED ONLY AFTER ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE THE SAME WITH THE U.S. AND U.K. FAILED.

4. COMMENT: THE VISITS OF HIGHLY VISIBLE U.S. PERSONS, WHILE CAUSING SOME SUSPICION IN INDIAN CIRCLES, DOES SERVE TO REMIND THEM OF OUR PRESENCE HERE, AND I SENSE THEY ARE TAKING US MORE SERIOUSLY. END COMMENT.
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: ~~BRIEFING CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ ON~~ NEXT STEPS ON
VIETNAMESE POLITICAL PRISONERS

REFS: (A) STATE 363625 (B) GENEVA 9886 (C) GENEVA 10054

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBASSY SHOULD BRIEF CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ DECEMBER 21 ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO MEET WITH THE VIETNAMESE IN GENEVA IN JANUARY TO DISCUSS POLITICAL PRISONERS, DRAWING UPON TALKING POINTS IN REF A. EMBASSY SHOULD INFORM SOLARZ THAT ALTHOUGH THE VIETNAMESE HAVE NOT YET RESPONDED TO OUR DECEMBER 12 AIDE MEMOIRE REQUESTING THEIR AGREEMENT TO A MEETING (REF B) THEY HAVE REQUESTED A MEETING WITH OUR AMBASSADOR IN GENEVA FOR DECEMBER 21, PRESUMABLY TO GIVE US THEIR RESPONSE (REF C). SOLARZ WILL PROBABLY NOT LEARN THE NATURE OF THEIR RESPONSE UNTIL HIS ARRIVAL IN HANOI ON DECEMBER 22. EMBASSY SHOULD GIVE CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ A COPY OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE TEXT CONTAINED IN REF A.

2. BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR THAILAND AND INDOCHINA,

DEPARTMENT BRIEFED CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ ON THE STATE OF PLAY OF THE U.S. INITIATIVE ON VIETNAMESE POLITICAL PRISONERS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THE EMBASSY WOULD EMPHASIZE TO SOLARZ THE IMPORTANCE OF REITERATING TO THE VIETNAMESE IN HANOI U.S. SINCERITY AND SERIOUSNESS IN FOLLOWING THROUGH ON THE RELEASE AND MOVEMENT OF THE PRISONERS AS CALLED FOR IN THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ANNOUNCED BY SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ ON SEPTEMBER 11.

3. SOLARZ SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO EMPHASIZE TO SRV OFFICIALS THAT:

-- THERE IS BROAD BIPARTISAN SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE USG FOR BRINGING THE RELEASED PRISONERS TO THE U.S.

-- WE WANT TO WORK OUT WITH THE SRV AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE A PRACTICAL PROGRAM FOR BRINGING THE PRISONERS TO THE U.S.

WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN GENEVA IN JANUARY. WE DO NOT WANT PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS TO STAND IN THE WAY OF AN AGREEMENT. WE ARE PREPARED TO BE

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FLEXIBLE.

-- THE SRV SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THERE ARE LAWS IN THE U.S. AGAINST ATTEMPTS BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS TO SEEK TO SUBVERT FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS FROM U.S. TERRITORY. WE WILL, OF COURSE, ENFORCE THESE LAWS.

"% HAVING SAID THIS, WE DO NOT THINK THESE MEN -- MANY OF WHOM ARE ELDERLY AND IN POOR HEALTH -- ARE INTERESTED IN SUCH ACTIVITIES. WE BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE ONLY INTERESTED IN LIVING IN PEACE WITH THEIR FAMILIES ONCE AGAIN.

-- THE U.S. IS EQUALLY COMMITTED TO SEEING A LARGER NUMBER OF AMERASIAN CHILDREN AND ACCOMPANYING FAMILY MEMBERS BROUGHT TO THE U.S. DURING THE COMING YEAR, AND WE ARE, OF COURSE, COMMITTED TO RECEIVING THEM ALL OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS.

4. GIVEN CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ'S RECORD OF CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH AND STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE RELEASE AND MOVEMENT TO THE U.S. OF AMERASIANS AND VIETNAMESE RE-EDUCATION CAMP PRISONERS, WE BELIEVE THAT HIS CONFIRMATION OF STRONG CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THESE USG INITIATIVES WILL POSITIVELY INFLUENCE THE SRV.

PC(RP/: 1145T)

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RUFHMK/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 5545
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 8633
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E.O. 12356:DECL:12/03/04
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MARR, NO
SUBJ: LABOR PARTY LEADER GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND'S

~~MEETING WITH CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ~~

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN A CONVERSATION WITH VISITING CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ, LABOR PARTY LEADER GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND REVIEWED LABOR PARTY VIEWS ON THE INF AND NNWFZ ISSUES, DESCRIBED HER VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE BRITISH LABOR PARTY AND GERMAN SPD AND COMMENTED ON THE ROLE OF THE U.S. WITHIN NATO AND NATO'S DEFENSE SPENDING TARGETS. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING HIS NOVEMBER 23-24 VISIT TO OSLO, CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER STRAY, CHIEF OF DEFENSE GENERAL BULL-HANSEN, MOD STATE SECRETARY HAMMERSTAD, STORTING FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AANO AND LABOR PARTY LEADER GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND. IN ADDITION, SOLARZ VISITED THE AFNORTH HEADQUARTERS, MET WITH RESEARCHERS FROM THE PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF OSLO AND LUNCHEd WITH PUBLIC OPINION SPECIALISTS FROM NORWAY'S GALLUP AFFILIATE. SOLARZ DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON ALLIANCE ISSUES, EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS, EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS. NORWEGIAN COMMENTS TO SOLARZ ON NATO'S DEFENSE SPENDING GOALS (OSLO 6665) AND ON SLCMS ARE REPORTED SEPTELS. THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES COVERED IN SOLARZ'S MEETING WITH GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND ARE REPORTED BELOW:

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4. SOLARZ BEGAN BY ASKING FOR AN EXPLANATION OF WHY LABOR HAD CHANGED FROM SUPPORTING NATO'S DOUBLE TRACK DECISION IN 1979 TO OPPOSING INF DEPLOYMENTS IN 1983.

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GRO DENIED THERE HAD BEEN ANY SHARP CHANGE IN LABOR PARTY POLICY. IN 1979, THE LABOR PARTY GOVERNMENT HAD AGREED TO SUPPORT THE DOUBLE TRACK DECISION ONLY AFTER THEN PRIME MINISTER NORDLI HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM PRESIDENT CARTER IN WASHINGTON THAT THE NEGOTIATING TRACK WOULD BE VIGOROUSLY PURSUED. WHEN JOINING NATO'S DECEMBER 1979 DECISION, THE NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVES HAD MADE CLEAR THE IMPORTANCE NORWAY PLACED ON NEGOTIATING REDUCTIONS. THE LABOR GOVERNMENT NEVER SOUGHT FORMAL PARLIAMENTARY ENDORSEMENT FOR ITS POSITION, FEARING THAT MANY IN THE LABOR PARTY'S STORTING GROUP WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT POSITION. GRO SAID THAT AFTER PRESIDENT CARTER'S DEFEAT, SHE AND THE PARTY BECAME CONVINCED IN 1980 AND 1981 THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS TRACK WAS NOT BEING PURSUED VIGOROUSLY AND THAT THIS WAS THE BASIS FOR THE PARTY'S BELIEF IN 1983 THAT DEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE POSTPONED FOR A PERIOD TO ALLOW MORE TIME TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRIMACY OF THE NEGOTIATION TRACK WAS, SHE SAID, THE COMMON THREAD RUNNING THROUGH THE LABOR PARTY POSITION.

5. WHEN PRESSED FOR A STATEMENT OF THE LABOR PARTY'S POSITION ON WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT INF NOW, GRO SAID THE LABOR PARTY FAVORED A MUTUAL MORATORIUM ON FURTHER INF DEPLOYMENTS AS A MEANS OF RETURNING TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, THAT LABOR FAVORED AND EXPECTED MERGER OF THE INF AND START TALKS AND THAT LABOR COULD ACCEPT A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME ON INF THAT WOULD ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO RETAIN A LARGER NUMBER OF INF MISSILES.

DEFENSE SPENDING

6. SOLARZ ASKED WHY THE LABOR PARTY WAS THE ONLY ONE OF THE NORTHERN EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES THAT SUPPORTED NATO'S 3 PERCENT TARGET FOR REAL GROWTH IN DEFENSE SPENDING. GRO SAID THE LABOR PARTY AND MOST NORWEGIANS RECOGNIZE THAT NORWAY IS IN AN EXPOSED POSITION STRATEGICALLY AND HENCE ARE STRONG SUPPORTERS BOTH OF NATO AND OF A CREDIBLE NORWEGIAN DEFENSE EFFORT.

7. WHEN SOLARZ ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE BETTER FOR NATO TO REPLACE ITS 3 PERCENT SPENDING TARGET WITH SOME OTHER MEASURE OF CONCRETE DEFENSE OUTPUT, GRO SAID THAT PEOPLE IN NORWAY WERE ACCUSTOMED TO THE 3 PERCENT TARGET AND THAT IT MIGHT BE BEST TO STICK WITH IT. SHE NOTED THAT AN ALTERNATIVE GOAL MIGHT BE MORE APPROPRIATE IN THOSE NATO COUNTRIES WHICH ARE NOT MEETING THE 3 PERCENT TARGET. SHE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT ANY NEW TARGET SHOULD BE A NATO-WIDE STANDARD AND

E.O. 12356:DECL:12/03/04

TAGS: PREL, PARM, MARR, NO

SUBJ: LABOR PARTY LEADER GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND'S

ALSO BE ENDORSED BY THE NORWEGIAN MILITARY AND DEFENSE MINISTER AND NOT SOMETHING IMPOSED BY "OUTSIDERS" FROM BRUSSELS.

NNWFZ

8. WHEN ASKED FOR A STATEMENT OF LABOR PARTY VIEWS ON A NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE (NNWFZ), GRO SAID THAT INTEREST IN THIS ISSUE HAD BEEN RE-KINDLED BY A FORMER LABOR PARTY MINISTER (EVENSEN) IN 1980 AFTER THE NATO INF DECISION AT A TIME WHEN THERE WAS WIDE PUBLIC FRUSTRATION IN NORWAY OVER LACK OF PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT AND A DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING TO DAMPEN THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. LABOR PARTY POLICY WAS THEN AND IS NOW, SHE SAID, THAT THE NNWFZ CAN BE CONSTRUCTIVE ONLY

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IF IT IS PURSUED IN THE CONTEXT OF OVERALL EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS AND IN CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO. GRO SAID NO FIRM POSITION HAD BEEN DEVELOPED ON WHETHER THE BALTIC SEA SHOULD BE INCLUDED BUT THAT THE GOAL WAS TO REDUCE THE MISSILES TARGETED ON THE NORDIC AREA. IN THIS RESPECT, SOVIET TACTICAL MISSILES IN THE KOLA WERE A CONCERN, BUT THAT NO ONE EXPECTS THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE SOVIET STRATEGIC MISSILES IN A NNWFZ AGREEMENT.

9. WHEN PRESSED TO ANSWER WHETHER AFTER CONSULTING WITH NATO NORWAY WOULD PROCEED WITH A NNWFZ AGREEMENT WHICH NATO DID NOT ENDORSE, GRO SAID THAT IF THE ALLIES DO NOT AGREE THEN NORWAY SHOULD NOT ACT UNILATERALLY. SHE ADDED THAT A MEANINGFUL NNWFZ WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE U.S. AND USSR TO RESPECT THE AGREEMENT.

10. SOLARZ COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS A POLITICAL ASPECT TO THE NNWFZ ISSUE AS WELL. IF ONE ALLY SHOULD ACT TO PERMANENTLY BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM ITS TERRITORY DESPITE ITS COMMITMENT TO NATO'S FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DOCTRINE, THIS WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO DO LIKEWISE. IF ALL MEMBERS FOLLOWED THAT ONE COUNTRY'S EXAMPLE, THE ALLIANCE WOULD UNRAVEL. THE ALLIANCE IS BASED ON SHARED RISKS. SOLARZ SAID THAT AS AN AMERICAN POLITICIAN, HE COULD SAY THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO PERSUADE AMERICANS TO PUT THEIR OWN POPULATIONS AT RISK IF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORY IN EUROPE.

EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS

11. SOLARZ ASKED FOR GRO'S ASSESSMENT OF TRENDS IN THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE UK LABOR PARTY AND THE GERMAN SPD, NOTING THAT SOME PEOPLE PROFESS SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE BUT PURSUE POLICIES WHICH ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ALLIANCE. GRO SAID THAT THE TRADITIONALLY HIGH DEGREE OF INTERNAL DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE UK LABOR PARTY UNFORTUNATELY FAVORED THE ELECTION OF EXTREMISTS, WHO WANT TO TAKE OVER THE PARTY. MICHAEL FOOTE WAS "HOPELESS;" KINNOCH WAS NOW AGAIN TRYING TO BRING THE PARTY TOGETHER, BUT IT REMAINS UNCERTAIN WHETHER HE WILL SUCCEED IN BRINGING THE PARTY BACK INTO THE MAINSTREAM. IF LABOR CAN WIN AN ELECTION, GRO THOUGHT KINNOCH MIGHT SUCCEED.

12. SOLARZ ASKED WHETHER DECISIONS BY A FUTURE UK LABOR GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT PLATFORM PLANS ON DOING AWAY WITH BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES AND REMOVING ALL U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE UK WOULD CONCERN NORWAY. GRO SAID THESE WERE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS, BUT ONES SHE HAD NOT FOCUSED ON. SHE SAID SHE BELIEVED THAT THE UK LABOR PARTY'S PARTICIPATION IN THE SCANDILUX GROUP HAD HELPED RESTRAIN UNHELPFUL TENDENCIES IN THE UK LABOR PARTY'S FOREIGN POLICIES. IF THE UK LABOR PARTY WON, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO ASCERTAIN WHAT THEY WOULD ACTUALLY DO IN OFFICE. SOLARZ COMMENTED THAT IT WAS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THE UK LABORITES UNDERSTAND THEIR ALLIES' VIEWS.

3. TURNING TO GERMANY, GRO SAID THAT THE NORWEGIAN LABOR PARTY HAS MUCH CLOSER TIES WITH THE SPD AND THAT THE DEBATES WITHIN HER LABOR PARTY HAD PARRALLELED

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SUBJ: LABOR PARTY LEADER GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND'S

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THOSE IN THE SPD. BOTH PARTIES PLACE IMPORTANCE ON THE NON-RATIFICATION OF SALT-II AND AGREE ON THE INF ISSUE. PARTICIPATION IN THE SCANDILUX CONSULTATIONS HAS BEEN IMPORTANT TO BOTH. NEVERTHELESS, NORWAY AND GERMANY WERE DIFFERENT HISTORICALLY AND GEOGRAPHICALLY, AND THE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE SPD ARE MUCH SHARPER THAN THOSE IN THE NORWEGIAN LABOR PARTY. BEING IN OPPOSITION HAS AFFECTED THE SPD MORE.

14. GRO SAID THAT THE SPD'S EGON BAHR HAD PROPOSED A FORMULA THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD ONLY BE DEPLOYED IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES AND THAT THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES SHOULD RELY SOLELY ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES. GRO SAID THIS WOULD MEAN A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN NATO STRATEGY AND CONSEQUENTLY, SHE HAD NOT SUPPORTED BAHR'S PROPOSAL.
U.S. RELIABILITY

15. GRO THEN STATED THAT NO ONE IN EUROPE COULD FEEL ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT THE U.S. WILL INDEED USE ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DEFEND EUROPE. HOW DO WE KNOW? WHEN ASKED WHAT CONCLUSION THIS UNCERTAINTY LED TO, GRO RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS NO REAL ANSWER. SOLARZ SAID NO ONE COULD KNOW WHAT A PARTICULAR PRESIDENT WOULD IN FACT DECIDE, BUT THAT PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THIS UNCERTAINTY, IT WAS IN EUROPE'S INTEREST TO KEEP THE SOVIET'S CONVINCED THAT THE U.S. WOULD ACT. IN THIS LIGHT, BAHR'S PROPOSAL WOULD BE VERY DESTRUCTIVE BECAUSE ITS IMPLEMENTATION WOULD GENERATE A NEGATIVE REACTION IN THE U.S. SOLARZ REITERATED HIS POINT THAT THE U.S.'S WILLINGNESS TO TAKE RISKS DEPENDS UPON EUROPE'S WILLINGNESS TO SHARE THOSE RISKS AND TO PURSUE POLICIES WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO, RATHER THAN UNDERMINE, DETERRENCE.

6. GRO THEN COMMENTED THAT ONE OF NATO'S DILEMMAS WAS THE IMBALANCE IN STRENGTH AND INFLUENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, EVEN WHEN THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE CONSIDERED TOGETHER. THIS MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO GET AN EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. SHOULD IT HAPPEN THAT DECISIONS ARE MADE IN WASHINGTON AND FORCED UPON THE ALLIANCE IN THE NAME OF UNITY, THIS WOULD BE VERY HARMFUL TO THE ALLIANCE. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE IS TO STRENGTHEN EUROPE IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE ALLIANCE. SOLARZ RESPONDED THAT INF ORIGINATED AS A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE; THERE HAD BEEN CONSULTATIONS AND A JOINT DECISION. GRO AGREED, BUT SAID THAT THE SAME COULD NOT BE SAID ABOUT THE SITUATION SINCE 1981. SOLARZ DISAGREED, SAYING THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY CONVINCED THAT THE UK, FRG AND ITALY REALLY DID SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT AND ADDED THAT HE HAD VOTED FOR INF MISSILES, DESPITE HIS CONSTITUENTS' OPPOSITION, BECAUSE HE BELIEVED IT IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S. TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH A PROGRAM IMPORTANT TO EUROPEANS.

WOMEN IN POLITICS

17. SOLARZ ASKED HOW GRO'S BEING A WOMAN HAD AFFECTED THE 1981 STORTING ELECTION. GRO SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE IMPACT BECAUSE IN ADDITION TO BEING A WOMAN SHE WAS ALSO CONSIDERED TO BE YOUNG AND NEW (AS SHE HAD JUST ASSUMED THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP SIX MONTHS BEFORE THE ELECTION). PERHAPS DEEP DOWN THERE HAD BEEN A SLIGHT NEGATIVE REACTION TO HER BEING A WOMAN. GRO SAID THIS WOULD NOT BE THE CASE AGAIN IN 1985 BECAUSE TIME HAD ACCUSTOMED NORWEGIANS TO THE IDEA OF A WOMAN PRIME MINISTER.

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18. THIS MESSAGE WAS PREPARED AFTER CODEL'S DEPARTURE
AND HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED BY CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ.
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E.O. 12356:DECL:11/29/94
TAGS: MARR, NATO, NO
SUBJ: NATO'S DEFENSE SPENDING TARGET

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. **SUMMARY:** WHILE IN OSLO, CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ BOUGHT NORWEGIAN REACTIONS TO THE IDEA OF REPLACING NATO'S 3 PERCENT REAL DEFENSE SPENDING GROWTH TARGET WITH A SHORT LIST OF PRIORITY DEFENSE PROGRAM GOALS IN AN EFFORT TO STIMULATE GREATER REAL DEFENSE EFFORT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. WHILE THERE WAS SYMPATHY FOR THE VIEW THAT THE 3 PERCENT TARGET WAS AN ARTIFICIAL MEASURE, EVEN THOSE NORWEGIANS MOST INTERESTED IN INCREASING NORWAY'S DEFENSE EFFORT CAUTIONED AGAINST SCRAPPING THE 3 PERCENT TARGET.

3. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT THIS ISSUE IS FAR LARGER THAN NORWAY, IT WOULD APPEAR FROM A NORWEGIAN PERSPECTIVE THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME BENEFIT FOR THE 1985 NATO MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE TO COMBINE THE TRADITIONAL 3 PERCENT TARGET WITH SOME MORE SPECIFIC FORCE CAPABILITY GOALS WHICH WOULD MEASURE DEFENSE OUT-PUT RATHER THAN FUNDING IN-PUT. WHILE RECOGNIZING THE DIFFICULTIES IN DEVISING OUT-PUT-ORIENTED GOALS, THEIR INTRODUCTION WOULD AT A MINIMUM BE HELPFUL HERE BY FOCUSING POLITICAL DEBATE MORE ON IMPROVING CONCRETE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. END SUMMARY.

4. DURING HIS NOVEMBER 23-24 VISIT TO OSLO, CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ RAISED NATO'S DEFENSE SPENDING GOALS WITH A VARIETY OF NORWEGIAN OFFICIALS AND POLITICIANS. SOLARZ NOTED THAT NATO MINISTERS WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE 3 PERCENT TARGET WHEN NEW MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE IS ISSUED IN 1985. THE PURPOSE OF THE 3 PERCENT GOAL HAD BEEN TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS TO REACH POLITICAL DECISIONS TO INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING. THE 3 PERCENT GOAL WAS NOT BEING MET IN MANY COUNTRIES AND AS A MEASURE OF DEFENSE INPUT IT OFTEN GAVE AN INACCURATE MEASURE OF REAL DEFENSE EFFORT. SOLARZ ASKED WHETHER REPLACING THE 3 PERCENT GOAL WITH A NUMBER OF CONCRETE, COUNTRY SPECIFIC OUT-PUT-ORIENTED DEFENSE GOALS WOULD BE A MORE USEFUL MEANS OF GETTING ADDITIONAL DEFENSE RE-

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SOURCES FROM PARLIAMENTS.

5. WHILE NOTING THAT NORWAY HAD MET OR EXCEEDED NATO'S 3 PERCENT TARGET IN RECENT YEARS, THE NORWEGIAN INTER-LOCATORS AGREED ABOUT THE IMPERFECTIONS OF THE 3 PERCENT TARGET. FOREIGN MINISTER STRAY SAID THAT IT IS OFTEN MISLEADING TO FOCUS ON AN EXPENDITURE PERCENTAGE AND THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO FOCUS ON OUT-PUT. CHIEF OF DEFENSE GENERAL BULL-HANSEN SAID THAT SOLARZ'S LOGIC WAS PERSUASIVE, THE PERCENTAGE DEBATE WAS STERILE AND THAT IN MANY COUNTRIES, INCLUDING NORWAY, THE PERCENTAGES IN FACT MASKED NON-PRODUCTIVE DEFENSE EXPENDITURE SUCH AS RESCUE SERVICES, POLICE-TYPE FUNCTIONS, INCREASED PAY AND OVERTIME COSTS. MOD STATE SECRETARY HAMMERSTAD DESCRIBED PERCENTAGES AS ARTIFICIAL AND NOTED THAT PUBLIC CONFUSION HAD BEEN CREATED BECAUSE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT FIGURES FOR NORWAY'S REAL DEFENSE SPENDING GROWTH IN 1983 SHOWED 2.8 PERCENT GROWTH WHILE NATO FIGURES SHOWED 4.0 PERCENT GROWTH.

6. NEVERTHELESS, THE NORWEGIANS UNIFORMLY CAUTIONED AGAINST DOING AWAY WITH THE 3 PERCENT TARGET. MOD STATE SECRETARY HAMMERSTAD SAID HE WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO ABANDON THE 3 PERCENT GOAL. PERCENTAGES ARE EASY TO UNDERSTAND. THE PERCENTAGES RELATE TO MONEY, AND THE AMOUNT OF MONEY APPROPRIATED IN PARLIAMENT IS IN THE END WHAT IS IMPORTANT. HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER DEVISING SPECIFIC PROJECT TARGETS WOULD BE A MORE EFFECTIVE APPROACH WITH THE STORTING. FORMIN STRAY SAID HE COULD NOT ANSWER WHETHER SPECIFIC GOALS WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN GETTING FUNDS FROM THE STORTING. HE COMMENTED THAT THE STORTING HAD BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO THE 3 PERCENT GOAL AND SAID IT HARD TO PREDICT HOW IT WOULD REACT TO A DIFFERENT APPROACH. LABOR PARTY LEADER GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND TOO SAID THAT NORWEGIAN POLITICIANS HAVE BECOME USED TO THE 3 PERCENT APPROACH AND THAT IT MIGHT BE BEST TO STICK WITH THAT. HOWEVER, SHE NOTED THAT NOT ALL NATO COUNTRIES WERE MEETING THE 3 PERCENT TARGET AND THAT PERHAPS SOME OTHER APPROACH MIGHT BE DESIRABLE IN THOSE COUNTRIES THAT WERE NOT MEETING 3 PERCENT. IF ANOTHER TARGET WERE DEVISED, IT WAS IMPORTANT A) THAT IT BE AN ALLIANCE-WIDE STANDARD, AND B) THAT IT BE A TARGET

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TAGS: MARR, NATO, NO

SUBJ: NATO'S DEFENSE SPENDING TARGET

FULLY ENDORSED BY THE NORWEGIAN CHIEF OF DEFENSE AND DEFENSE MINISTER AND NOT SOMETHING IMPOSED BY "OUTSIDERS" IN BRUSSELS.

7. CHOD GENERAL BULL-HANSEN, WHO HAS ARGUED PUBLICLY THIS FALL THAT SPECIFIC DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS ARE MORE IMPORTANT MEASURES OF DEFENSE SPENDING THAN PERCENTAGES, SAID HE WOULD PREFER SPECIFIC OUT-PUT MEASURES IF SUCH WERE POSSIBLE, BUT THAT DEVISING AND AGREEING UPON THEM WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. BULL-HANSEN SAID THAT SACEUR WAS CORRECT IN UNDERTAKING A REVIEW OF NATO'S FORCE GOALS SYSTEM BECAUSE THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS IMPERFECT, THE GOALS ARE TOO DEATILED AND NOT ADEQUATELY PRIORITIZED. THE GAP BETWEEN FORCE GOALS AND WHAT IS REALISTICALLY POSSIBLE IS TOO GREAT AND CONSEQUENTLY THE FORCE GOAL RECOMMENDATIONS ARE NOT FOLLOWED. HE DESCRIBED NATO'S CHALLENGE SYSTEM AS INSULTING TO INDIVIDUAL NATIONS. BULL-HANSEN FEARED THAT MANY OF THE SAME DIFFICULTIES WOULD ARISE IN ANY EFFORT

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TO DEFINE SPECIFIC OUT-PUT-ORIENTED DEFENSE GOALS. WHEN ASKED ABOUT AN APPROACH OF PRIORITIZING THREE OR FOUR SPECIFIC GOALS FOR EACH COUNTRY, BULL-HANSEN SAID THAT THIS IS ALREADY DONE TO A CERTAIN EXTENT. WHAT HAPPENS IS THAT THE POLITICIANS AGREE WITH THE PRIORITIES BUT THEN INSIST THAT THE PROGRAMS BE STRETCHED OUT OVER LONGER TIME FRAMES TO FIT WITHIN EXISTING RESOURCES.

8. WHEN ASKED WHY PEOPLE RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO RAISE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD BUT AREN'T WILLING TO SPEND THE MONEY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, BULL-HANSEN COMMENTED THAT IS JUST THE WAY PEOPLE ARE, ONE MUST NOT EXPECT PEOPLE TO ACT LOGICALLY; IT IS UNFORTUNATELY THE EXCEPTION WHEN PEOPLE SET GOALS AND ACT TO CARRY THEM OUT.

9. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH NORWAY IS MEETING THE 3 PERCENT TARGET, IT IS GETTING LESS DEFENSE PER KRONER FROM THE INCREASED EXPENDITURE DUE TO THE ESCALATING COST OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND INCREASES IN PERSONNEL COSTS. AT THE SAME TIME, MANY IN NORWAY CITE THE 3 PERCENT GOAL IN ARGUING THAT NORWAY IS ALREADY DOING ENOUGH IN DEFENSE. DESPITE ITS IMPERFECTIONS, THOUGHTFUL NORWEGIAN SUPPORTERS OF A GREATER DEFENSE EFFORT CAUTION AGAINST ABANDONING THE 3 PERCENT TARGET. IN ADDITION TO THEIR ARGUMENTS, EMBASSY NOTES THAT THE 3 PERCENT TARGET WOULD HELP MAINTAIN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES UNDER A POSSIBLE FUTURE LABOR GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THE LABOR PARTY IS COMMITTED TO THAT TARGET.

10. THE NORWEGIAN CAUTIONS ABOUT ABANDONING THE 3 PERCENT TARGETS DO NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT NATO MIGHT COMBINE THE 3 PERCENT GOAL WITH SPECIFIC OUT-PUT-ORIENTED GOALS IN AN EFFORT TO DEVISE DEFENSE GOALS WHICH ARE EFFECTIVE IN THE DIFFERENT POLITICAL SITUATIONS IN SEPARATE NATO COUNTRIES. THE INJECTION OF SPECIFIC DEFENSE GOALS INTO THE PUBLIC (AS CONTRASTED WITH DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT) DEBATE IN NORWAY WOULD IN ANY EVENT BE A CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT.

11. THIS CABLE WAS PREPARED AFTER CODEL'S DEPARTURE AND HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED BY CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ. STUART

END OF MESSAGE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, MARR, DA
SUBJECT: VISIT OF A NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIP TO DENMARK

REF: 82 COPENHAGEN 3567

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING A RECENT VISIT WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND PETER DYVIG, PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, ON WHICH I ACCOMPANIED [REDACTED], THEY BOTH SAID THAT DENMARK HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO VISITS BY US NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIPS ALTHOUGH THERE HAD NOT BEEN ANY MADE FOR SOMETIME. THE MATTER WAS NOT PURSUED FURTHER AT THAT TIME.

3. FOLLOWING UP ON THE CONVERSATION, I CALLED ON DYVIG AND EXPRESSED MY PLEASURE WITH WHAT SOUNDED LIKE A VERY POSITIVE DANISH ADDITUDE AND INDICATED A DESIRE TO TAKE THEM AT THEIR WORD ON THIS MATTER AND TRY TO ARRANGE FOR A VISIT BY A NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIP AT AN EARLY DATE. I EXPLAINED THAT THE LACK OF ANY HIGH LEVEL APPROACH BY THE US GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN DUE TO UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS (REFTEL) WHICH HAD BEEN PLACED, INCLUDING A REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ON EACH VESSEL, SPECIAL CONDITIONS ON COMPENSATION FOR ANY POSSIBLE ACCIDENT AND THE APPARENT REQUIREMENT FOR AN EMERGENCY OR INCIDENT PLAN. DENMARK DID NOT SEEM PREPARED TO MAKE ANY EFFORTS TO COMPROMISE ON THESE ISSUES.

4. I SAID THAT THERE WAS A GENERAL FEELING THAT THE MATTER WAS TOO SENSITIVE TO RECEIVE DANISH GOVERNMENT APPROVAL IN THE RECENT PAST. I INTERPRETED THE COMMENTS MADE BY HIM AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THESE REQUIREMENTS WOULD NO LONGER BE POSED, HOWEVER. I THEREFORE ASKED FOR ADVICE ON HOW TO PROCEED ON THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIP VISITS TO DENMARK.

5. DYVIG SAID THAT WHENEVER WE KNEW OF A SCHEDULED VISIT TO A NORTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY, PREFERABLY TO

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NORWAY, WITH ABOUT A THREE TO FOUR MONTH LEAD TIME, I SHOULD WRITE TO HIM REFERRING TO OUR CONVERSATION AND ASKING PERMISSION FOR THE SHIP VISIT. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WOULD THEN CARRY THE ISSUE WITHIN THE DANISH GOVERNMENT FROM THAT POINT AND TRY TO OBTAIN PERMISSION FOR THE VISIT.

6. ACTION REQUESTED: SINCE WE UNDERSTAND THAT DENMARK IS THE ONLY NATO COUNTRY WHICH HAS NOT RECEIVED A NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIP VISIT, OR FOR WHICH ONE IS NOT SCHEDULED, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT A VISIT BY A NUCLEAR POWERED SURFACE WARSHIP BE SCHEDULED IN THE MARCH-MAY 1985 TIME FRAME. I WOULD APPRECIATE BEING ADVISED WELL IN ADVANCE (3-4 MONTHS) SO THAT I CAN PROCEED WITH THE LETTER TO MFA IN THE HOPE OF GETTING A BREAKTHROUGH ON THIS MATTER. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD AVOID PROPOSING A VISIT BY A NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIP SUCH AS A SUBMARINE OR CARRIER LIKELY TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF DENMARK'S BAN ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON DANISH TERRITORY IN PEACETIME (REFTEL). TODMAN
END OF MESSAGE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, NATO, FR, GE, US
SUBJECT: RAYMOND BARRE'S MEETING WITH [REDACTED]

1. (C ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: IN A 40-MINUTE MEETING ON NOVEMBER 28, FORMER PRIME MINISTER BARRE HAD A NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS ON EUROPE'S FUTURE, THE CONDITION OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND US-FRENCH RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. EUROPE -- DECLINE OR RENEWAL?

SOLARZ OPENED THE MEETING BY EVOKING RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF EUROPE'S DECLINE, ITS INABILITY TO KEEP PACE ECONOMICALLY WITH THE US AND OTHER COMPETITORS, AND ASKED BARRE WHETHER THESE PROBLEMS WERE STRUCTURAL AND IRREVOCABLE. BARRE SAID THAT HE DID NOT SHARE THIS PESSIMISM. HE THOUGHT THE CURRENT PSYCHOLOGICAL CRISIS WAS DUE TO TWO BASIC FACTORS. FIRST, THE DIFFICULT ECONOMIC TIMES USHERED IN BY THE OIL CRISIS OF THE 1970S, AND SECOND, PUBLIC UNWILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE IN ORDER TO PUT THEIR COUNTRIES BACK ON TRACK ECONOMICALLY. FOR A LONG TIME, PUBLICS HAD NOT BELIEVED THAT A LONG-TERM ECONOMIC CRISIS REALLY EXISTED, AND HAD STRONGLY RESISTED CURBING THEIR DEMAND FOR EVER-HIGHER INCOMES, BENEFITS, ETC. THE FACT THAT WEST EUROPEAN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURES WERE MORE RIGID THAN THOSE OF THE US HELPED EXPLAIN WHY THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY WAS MUCH SLOWER IN COMING. BUT THE PUBLIC WAS NOW COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR MORE AUSTERE POLICIES. MOREOVER, THE FACT THAT MANY EUROPEAN FIRMS WERE COMPETING EFFECTIVELY ON THE WORLD SCENE SHOWED THAT IT COULD BE DONE.

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4. HOPEFUL SIGNS

BARRE SAW ANOTHER CAUSE FOR OPTIMISM IN THE FACT THAT ECONOMIC NATIONALISM WAS BEING REJECTED AS A FALSE

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SOLUTION. HE NOTED THAT IN 1983, SOME OF THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY'S LEFT WING HAD WANTED FRANCE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM AND ADOPT MORE PROTECTIONIST POLICIES. THIS HAD BEEN FIRMLY REJECTED BY THE GOVERNMENT. HE THOUGHT THAT EUROPE COULD MAKE A COMEBACK AND ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY COMPETITIVE POSITION ONCE AGAIN, BUT IT MIGHT TAKE TEN YEARS TO CHANGE THE SITUATION COMPLETELY.

5. WELFARE SYSTEMS

ASKED BY SOLARZ WHETHER THE HIGH PERCENTAGE OF GDP DEVOTED BY MANY WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO SOCIAL PROGRAMS WAS A CAUSE OF THE CURRENT STAGNATION, BARRE RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS PARTLY TRUE, BUT NOTED THAT WELFARE PROGRAMS WERE A BALANCING FACTOR THAT PREVENTED SOCIAL STRIFE IN TIMES OF CRISIS. BARRE THOUGHT THAT IN FRANCE SOCIAL SPENDING WOULD LEVEL OFF, SO THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME DECLINE IN REAL TERMS. THE REAL CHALLENGE, HE SAID, WAS TO DEVELOP THE PRODUCTIVE FORCES OF THE COUNTRY. AS PRIME MINISTER IN 1978, HE HAD ELIMINATED PRICE CONTROLS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS, AND IN TWO YEARS' TIME INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION HAD PROVIDED GREAT RESOURCES BOTH FOR FURTHER INVESTMENT AND FOR SOCIAL PROGRAMS. PEOPLE ARE BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND NOW THAT OVERREGULATION AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL TEND TO STIFLE ECONOMIC GROWTH.

6. EUROPE UNITED?

BARRE RESPONDED AFFIRMATIVELY TO SOLARZ' QUESTION WHETHER SUCH PROGRESS WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER MOVEMENT TOWARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. PEOPLE STRESS THE CRISIS OF THE EC, BUT IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN IN CRISIS, AND A SOLUTION HAS ALWAYS BEEN FOUND. THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES UNDERSTAND THAT THEY CANNOT SURVIVE ALONE. HE CITED CONSTRUCTION OF THE EMS DURING HIS TENURE AS PRIME MINISTER AS A SUCCESS. BARRE THOUGHT THAT THE EC WOULD SUCCEED IN TIME IN ELIMINATING NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE. ONE KEY PROBLEM, HE SAID, WAS TO PERSUADE GOVERNMENTS TO PURCHASE OUTSIDE THEIR OWN NATIONAL ECONOMIES. BARRE ALSO THOUGHT THAT MORE LINKS WOULD DEVELOP BETWEEN COMPANIES IN VARIOUS EC COUNTRIES, BEGINNING WITH HIGH-TECH FIRMS. ASKED BY SOLARZ ABOUT A "UNITED STATES OF EUROPE" A LA JEAN MONNET, BARRE SAID IT SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS DEFINITELY DEAD. THE PROBLEM STILL LAY IN THE FUTURE. THE WOULD-BE "BUILDERS OF "EUROPE" OF THE 1950S HAD EXPECTED TOO MUCH TOO SOON. ALL THE MAJOR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, NATO, FR, GE, US

SUBJECT: RAYMOND BARRE'S MEETING WITH CODEL SOLARZ

EC ISSUES TOOK YEARS TO RESOLVE; ENLARGEMENT WAS ONE EXAMPLE, BUT GREATER INTEGRATION WAS IN EUROPE'S INTEREST.

7. THE US FACTOR

ASKED ABOUT THE ROLE THE US MIGHT PLAY IN PROMOTING ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN EUROPE, BARRE SAID THAT GREATER MONETARY STABILITY WOULD HELP. GREAT FLUCTUATIONS IN EXCHANGE RATES WERE DANGEROUS. MANY FRENCH FIRMS WERE NOW REAPING LARGE PROFITS EXPORTING TO THE US, BUT A CATASTROPHE COULD ENSUE FOR THEM IF THE DOLLAR DIPS. HE RECOGNIZED THAT CAPITAL MOVEMENTS MADE CONTROL DIFFICULT, BUT WOULD LIKE TO SEE SOME REDUCTION IN US INTEREST RATES, COUPLED WITH SOME DEGREE OF

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COOPERATION BETWEEN THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE EUROPEAN
CENTRAL BANKS IN CONTROLLING EXCHANGE RATES.

8. SECURITY ISSUES

SOLARZ ASKED BARRE HOW CONCERNED HE WAS ABOUT RECENT TRENDS IN WEST GERMANY (THE GREENS, ANTI-NUCLEAR SENTIMENT, ETC.). BARRE OPINED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF INF DEPLOYMENT SHOWED GREAT POLITICAL MATURITY IN THE FRG. HE CONTENDED THAT 80 PERCENT OF WEST GERMANS ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR THE MISSILES. THE GREEN PHENOMENON REPRESENTED A NEW GERMAN NATIONALISM, PARTICULARLY A NEW YEARNING FOR NORMAL RELATIONS WITH GERMANS IN THE GDR. HE THOUGHT THAT A MODERATE OSTPOLITIK AS UNDERTAKEN BY THE KOHL GOVERNMENT BY AND LARGE WOULD SATISFY THESE ASPIRATIONS AND KEEP THEM FROM GETTING OUT OF HAND. ASKED ABOUT FORMER CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT'S PROPOSAL FOR FRANCE TO EXTEND A NUCLEAR UMBRELLA OVER WEST GERMANY, BARRE SAW NO SENSE IN THE IDEA. IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR FRANCE TO EXPRESS TOO PRECISELY THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH HER NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD BE USED; BESIDES, THE IDEA HAD NO REAL SUPPORT IN THE FRG. BARRE THOUGHT HOWEVER, THAT INTRA-EUROPEAN COOPERATION ON DEFENSE ISSUES SHOULD BE INCREASED THROUGH THE WEST EUROPEAN UNION.

9. ASKED ABOUT CURRENT EFFORTS TO BOLSTER NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES, BARRE NOTED ONLY THAT THIS EFFORT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE. ASKED FOR HIS THOUGHTS ON THE UPCOMING SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING, HE SAID THAT THE KEY TO THE SITUATION WAS THAT THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THE ALLIANCE WOULD STAND FIRM. THE OVERALL STATE OF THE ALLIANCE MIGHT BE BETTER NOW THAN EVER. ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN SOME DISPARITIES IN MILITARY CAPABILITY VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS, ALLIANCE POLITICAL COHESION HAD BEEN REINFORCED. THERE MAY BE PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC OPINION IN SOME OF THE SMALLER COUNTRIES, BUT THE ONLY IMPORTANT FACTOR WAS OPINION IN FRANCE, WEST GERMANY, THE UK, AND ITALY. IN THOSE COUNTRIES, PUBLIC OPINION WAS SOLIDLY BEHIND NATO.

10. FRENCH POLITICS

BARRE ENDED THE INTERVIEW WITH SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT INTERNAL POLITICAL TRENDS. MITTERRAND AND THE SOCIALISTS HAD BEEN DISCREDITED BECAUSE THEY HAD MADE DEMAGOGIC PROMISES IN 1981 AND FAILED TO DELIVER. THE PUBLIC ACCEPTS THE NEED FOR A MOVE TOWARD AUSTERITY, BUT STILL BLAMES THE GOVERNMENT FOR ITS INITIAL MISTAKES. FROM BARRE'S POINT OF VIEW, THE MOST DISTRESSING BYPRODUCT OF SOCIALIST FAILURES HAS BEEN THE WEAKENING OF THE INSTITUTION OF THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY. THOUGH SOME MIGHT FEEL THAT HE (BARRE) WAS PROFITING FROM THIS TREND, THE LACK OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN MITTERRAND WAS DISTURBING FOR THOSE WHO RESPECTED THE FIFTH REPUBLIC'S INSTITUTIONS.

11. COMMENT. BARRE WAS IN GOOD FORM. ONE FELT THAT HIS PUBLIC IMAGE OF A NON-POLEMICAL AND ALMOST NON-PARTISAN STATESMAN IS NOT FEIGNED, BUT REFLECTS A WILLINGNESS TO SEE ISSUES FROM SEVERAL DIFFERENT ANGLES -- INCLUDING THE BROAD NATIONAL INTEREST. END COMMENT.
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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: ETTC, KSTC, COCOM
SUBJECT: (U) DISCUSSION OF COCOM WITH **CODEL SOLARZ**.

1. (LOU) ENTIRE TEXT

2. CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ RAISED WITH AMBASSADOR NOVEMBER 25 A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT COCOM. HE BEGAN BY ASKING HOW EFFECTIVE COCOM IS AND IF IT IS WORTH THE AGGRAVATION IT SEEMS TO CAUSE OUR ALLIES. WE REPLIED THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE PRECISELY COCOM'S EFFECTIVENESS, BUT GIVEN THE RESOURCES THE SOVIETS PUT INTO ACQUIRING WESTERN TECHNOLOGY ILLEGALLY, COCOM PROBABLY HINDERS AND SIGNIFICANTLY DELAYS SOVIET ACQUISITION EFFORTS. AMBASSADOR RECOMMENDED THAT SOLARZ REQUEST THE EXCELLENT CIA BRIEFING AVAILABLE ON WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE DOING IN THIS AREA. WE ALSO SAID THE AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE RECENTLY COMPLETED LIST REVIEW DEMONSTRATE ALLIED COOPERATION AND SUPPORT OF STRATEGIC CONTROLS; IT IS U.S. ATTEMPTS TO USE COCOM FOR FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES THAT HAVE CAUSED SOME FRICTION WITH OUR ALLIES.

3. SOLARZ ASKED IF EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS HAD CAUSED ANY PROBLEM IN COCOM. WE SAID AGAIN THAT THE ONLY PROBLEM IS WITH FOREIGN POLICY CONTROLS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN AGREED IN COCOM. OUR COCOM PARTNERS ENFORCE U.S. REEXPORT CONTROLS ON STRATEGIC PRODUCTS, BUT THE SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE EPISODE, WHICH AFFECTED GOODS NOT UNDER COCOM CONTROL, DID CREATE PROBLEMS. IN ANSWER TO A SOLARZ QUESTION ABOUT THE NEUTRALS AND OTHER COUNTRIES OUTSIDE COCOM WHICH PRODUCE STRATEGIC GOODS, WE EXPLAINED THE CURRENT EFFORT BY COCOM MEMBERS TO APPROACH THESE THIRD COUNTRIES TO IMPROVE THE WORLD-WIDE CONTROL OF STRATEGIC EXPORTS.

4. IN A DISCUSSION OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT,

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SOLARZ (WHO WAS ON THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE FOR THE
EAA) WANTED TO KNOW IF THE COCOM COUNTRIES WERE
CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF U.S. IMPORT
RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN COMPANIES VIOLATING COCOM RULES
AND ON WEST-WEST TECHNOLOGY CONTROLS. WE SAID A NUMBER
OF DELEGATIONS HAD EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT THESE
POSSIBILITIES. SOLARZ THEN ASKED IF THE DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT WAS TOO SLOW IN PROCESSING COCOM EXCEPTION
REQUESTS, TO WHICH WE REPLIED THAT, WHILE THERE HAD
BEEN SOME COMPLAINTS ABOUT SLOW PROCESSING OF CASES,
DOD WAS IMPROVING ITS COMPUTERIZED SYSTEM OF CASE
HANDLING WHICH SHOULD HELP TO CUT DOWN ON THE RESPONSE
TIME. STREATOR
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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OREP, PREL, BE, CG
SUBJECT: ~~NGUZA-SOLARZ MEETING~~
REF: BRUSSELS 15293

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY

AT HIS SPECIFIC REQUEST, THE EMBASSY ARRANGED A PRIVATE MEETING FOR CONGRESSMAN STEPHEN SOLARZ (D-N.Y.) WITH PROMINENT ZAIRIAN EXILE POLITICIAN AND FORMER PRIME MINISTER NGUZA KARL-I-BOND. SOLARZ QUESTIONED NGUZA AT LENGTH ON HIS VIEWS ABOUT RECENT EVENTS IN ZAIRE AND ZAIRE'S FUTURE. NGUZA SAID MOBUTU STAGED THE MOBA "INVASION," SUPPRESSED A COUP ATTEMPT IN OCTOBER AND WILL NOT LAST LONG. HE URGED U.S. PLANNING TO ENSURE A PRO-WESTERN SUCCESSOR. ALTHOUGH MANY OF THESE VIEWS MAY BE FAMILIAR, WE REPORT THEM AT SOME LENGTH IN VIEW OF THE INTEREST FOCUSED ON THE RECENT DRAMATIC EVENTS IN ZAIRE.

3. WE MUST AVOID A KHOMEINI IN ZAIRE.

NGUZA STARTED BY MAKING AN ANALOGY WITH IRAN. THE UNITED STATES KNEW THE SHAH WAS SICK AND DID NOT MOVE TO GUARANTEE A FRIENDLY SUCCESSION. IT MUST NOT MAKE THAT MISTAKE IN ZAIRE. MOBUTU IS OUR FRIEND, BUT ONLY EFFECTIVELY EXERCISED U.S. INFLUENCE CAN GUARANTEE A FRIENDLY SUCCESSOR.

4. MOBUTU WILL NOT LAST LONG.

AFTER 19 YEARS IN POWER, NGUZA SAID, MOBUTU IS EITHER

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TIRED OR SICK. AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL AND OTHER REPORTS ARE THAT HE HAS LEUKEMIA. MOBUTU SEES A SWISS DOCTOR IN LAUSANNE REGULARLY. HE SAW HIM AGAIN A WEEK OR SO AGO. NGUZA DOES NOT KNOW, BUT FEELS THE SPECULATION THAT MOBUTU HAS LEUKEMIA MAY BE SOLIDLY BASED. HE HOPES WE KNOW. MOBUTU LOOKED MUCH OLDER THAN HIS 54 YEARS WHEN HE CAME TO BELGIUM, NGUZA SAID.

5. PALACE COUP ATTEMPT WAS REAL

SOLARZ ASKED ABOUT LAST WEEK'S EVENTS IN ZAIRE. NGUZA FIRST DIGRESSED. HE SAID THERE REALLY WAS A PALACE COUP IN OCTOBER, BY MEMBERS OF MOBUTU'S "PRAETORIAN GUARD", INCLUDING A CAPTAIN, ALL FROM MOBUTU'S OWN EQUATEUR REGION. MOBUTU ANNOUNCED THAT FIVE WERE ARRESTED AND EXECUTED FOR ABUSING CIVILIANS, BUT THEY WERE REALLY 14. THEY WERE ARRESTED AND SHOT THE SAME DAY FOR A COUP ATTEMPT, NOT FOR ABUSING CIVILIANS. WHILE DENYING THE COUP REPORTS, MOBUTU NEVER ATTACKED NGUZA FOR DISSEMINATING THEM. ONE CAN ONLY ANALYZE THAT THE PLOTTERS, TOO, KNEW OR HAD HEARD THAT MOBUTU WAS ILL, AND FELT THAT THE BEST WAY TO PRESERVE EQUATEURIAN POWER WAS A QUICK TAKEOVER BEFORE MOBUTU'S DEMISE.

6. MOBA "INVASION" STAGED BY MOBUTU.

RETURNING TO SOLARZ' QUESTION, NGUZA SAID THERE WAS NO INCURSION FROM TANZANIA AND THERE WERE NO EXILE ENVOYS FROM BRUSSELS. THE MOBA INCIDENT WAS A FALLING OUT BETWEEN SMUGGLERS AND THEIR PROTECTORS -- A LOCAL INTERNAL INCIDENT. THE REBEL REMNANTS IN THE MOUNTAINS BETWEEN MOBA AND KALEMIE LONG SINCE GAVE UP INSURRECTION AND TURNED TO SMUGGLING IVORY TO TANZANIA WITH THE COMPLICITY OF THE LOCAL GARRISONS. THE NEWLY ARRIVED COMMANDERS OR INSPECTORS WERE EITHER NOT IN ON THE ARRANGEMENT OR TRIED TO UPSET IT. THE EX-REBEL SMUGGLERS, WHO ARE ARMED, FOUGHT BACK. MOBUTU DELIBERATELY TURNED IT INTO A PHONY INVASION. HE HAD FOUR REASONS: (1) SHAKEN BY THE PALACE COUP, HE WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS ARMY IS EFFECTIVE AND SOLIDLY BEHIND HIM; (2) TAKING A STANCE AGAINST SOCIALIST, ANTI-WESTERN TANZANIA IS A GOOD WAY TO PLEASE THE PRESENT U.S. ADMINISTRATION; (3) BY ACCUSATIONS AGAINST BELGIUM AND (THROUGH THE MITTERAND VISIT) PLAYING FRANCE AGAINST BELGIUM, HE PUTS BELGIUM ON THE DEFENSIVE IN NEGOTIATIONS TO INCREASE BELGIAN MILITARY AID; AND (4) HE ALSO PUTS

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OREP, PREL, BE, CG
SUBJECT: NGUZA-SOLARZ MEETING

PRESSURE ON BELGIUM TO CURTAIL OR EXPEL EXILES LIKE HIMSELF AND TRIES TO TAR THEM, FALSELY, WITH THE TERRORIST OR ARMED INSURRECTIONIST BRUSH. NGUZA ASSERTED REPEATEDLY THAT HE WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE PLANNING OF THE ACTION. AN ORGANIZATION IN PARIS, HE SAID, MAY HAVE HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH IT.

7. NGUZA'S NOVEMBER 20 PRESS VERSION SLIGHTLY - DIFFERENT.

NGUZA TOLD SOLARZ THAT THE ANALYSIS IN THE ABOVE TWO PARAGRAPHS WAS MUCH LIKE THAT IN AN ARTICLE HE HAD

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PREPARED FOR THE NOVEMBER 20 LE SOIR. THE ACTUAL ARTICLE PORTRAYS THE MOBA INCIDENT AS A MUTINY BY THE MOBA GARRISON, TO JOIN LOCAL REBEL REMNANTS WHO LIVE BY PILLAGE AROUND MOBA, SUBSEQUENTLY PUT DOWN BY OTHER ARMY ELEMENTS. NGUZA'S ARTICLE SAID OTHER VERSIONS ALSO CIRCULATE IN ZAIRIAN CIRCLES, BUT ALL COINCIDE ON THE POINT THAT NO ZAIRIAN EXILE IN BRUSSELS WAS INVOLVED.

8. PERSONAL INVITATION TO RETURN.

SOLARZ SAID THAT VISITING THE PHILIPPINES RECENTLY HE FOUND A RULER (MARCOS) RICHER AND EVEN MORE CORRUPT THAN MOBUTU. PICKING UP ON THAT LEAD, NGUZA SAID THAT, NOT LONG AFTER PHILIPPINE OPPOSITION LEADER AQUINO'S MURDER, MOBUTU SENT NGUZA'S SISTER-IN-LAW TO INVITE NGUZA TO RETURN, SAYING MOBUTU HAD CHANGED. SHE SAID SERVING AS PRIME OR FOREIGN MINISTER WAS THE WORST THAT AWAITED NGUZA. HE DECLINED, SAYING PRINCIPLES, NOT PERSONALITIES, PREVENT HIS RETURN. THIS PERSONAL FORM OF INVITATION, NGUZA COMMENTED, SHOWS THAT MOBUTU WAS SINCERE AND CONCERNED, PERHAPS WORRIED ABOUT WHAT WILL HAPPEN AFTER HE GOES.

9. AFTER MOBUTU, WHAT?

SOLARZ ASKED WHAT WILL HAPPEN WHEN MOBUTU GOES, AND IF THERE ARE CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSION PROVISIONS. NGUZA SAID YES, THE ELDEST MEMBER OF THE PARTY COUNCIL TAKES OVER AND PREPARES ELECTIONS, BUT EVERYONE KNOWS THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN. THE MILITARY WILL TAKE OVER, BUT THERE ARE FIVE SEPARATE MILITARIES. THE FIRST OF THESE IS THE PRAETORIAN GUARDS. ISRAELI-TRAINED, SOLARZ ASKED? YES, AND VERY EFFECTIVELY, SAID NGUZA. BUT COMPLETELY SEPARATE AND POTENTIALLY ANTAGONISTIC ARE THE FRENCH-TRAINED AND LED PARACHUTE BRIGADE, THE BELGIAN-TRAINED UNIT (KAMANYOLA, SOLARZ ASKED AND NGUZA CONFIRMED), A CHINESE-ORGANIZED UNIT AT STANLEYVILLE AND ALL THE REST -- LIKE THOSE AT MOBA. WILL THE BELGIANS, FRENCH AND ISRAELIS BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE SUCCESSION, SOLARZ ASKED? NO, ONLY THE U.S., NGUZA REPLIED. THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT IS TOO WEAK AND INTERNALLY DIVIDED, PREOCCUPIED BY ITS WALLOON-FLEMISH "TRIBAL" PROBLEMS. THE FRENCH, UNLIKE ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA, WOULD DEFER TO WASHINGTON IN ZAIRE WHICH IS BELGO-AMERICAN TURF. ALSO, MOBUTU SHREWDLY LINED THE FRENCH UP BEHIND HIM WITH HIS CHAD MOVE. THE CHINESE -- WHO KNOWS? ONLY A DECISIVE ORD FROM WASHINGTON WOULD PULL THE FEUDING MILITARY TOGETHER, AVOID A CIVIL WAR AND BRING ABOUT A PRO-WESTERN SUCCESSION. NGUZA AND HIS ALLIES WOULD NOT WISH A CIVIL WAR ON THEIR SUFFERING COUNTRY AND WOULD NOT WANT TO GOVERN ON ITS ASHES. SOLARZ ASKED IF NGUZA HAD MUCH CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS. WHEN HE SAID NO, SOLARZ OFFERED TO GET HIM IN TOUCH WITH ISRAEL'S LEADING FOREIGN MINISTRY AFRICAN EXPERT.

10. NGUZA'S COALITION.

NGUZA SAID THAT HE AND HIS CONGOLESE DEMOCRATIC FRONT REFUSE TO ACCEPT PARTICIPATION BY OR COOPERATION WITH COMMUNIST OR LUMUMBIST EXILE ORGANIZATIONS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE WORKS WITH THE REMNANTS OF THE 13 PARLIAMENTARIANS. THE 13 (OR UDPS) ARE REPRESENTED IN BELGIUM BY DIKONDA, HE NOTED. FIVE OF THE 13

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OREP, PREL, BE, CG
SUBJECT: NGUZA-SOLARZ MEETING

DEFECTED AND RECEIVED HOUSES, CARS AND MONEY FROM MOBUTU. SIX ARE STEADFAST IN ZAIRE, BANISHED TO THEIR VILLAGES (TSHISEKEDI, NGALULA, KIBASSA, ETC.). THE 13 HAD MAJORITY SUPPORT SOME TIME BACK, BUT MISERY AND WESTERN BACKING FOR MOBUTU HAD DISILLUSIONED THE MASSES. AN EXAMPLE OF HOW MOBUTU PLAYS UPON AND EXAGGERATES THAT SUPPORT WAS A SOLID MONTH OF MEDIA PUBLICITY GIVEN MITTERAND'S AND PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRAISE OF MOBUTU'S AUSTERITY MEASURES, NGUZA SAID.

11. PRAISE FOR AUSTERITY.

TO SHOW HE GAVE CREDIT WHERE IT IS DUE, NGUZA RECOGNIZED THE POSITIVE NATURE OF MOBUTU'S AUSTERITY PROGRAM, BUT SAID, IT'S REALLY IMF-DICTATED AND MOBUTU GOES ALONG ONLY BECAUSE HE HAS TO. IF THE IMF LETS UP, THINGS WILL BE AS BEFORE.

12. REMINISCENCES.

NGUZA RECALLED HOW HE AND MOBUTU PARTED WAYS. HE HAD BEEN IN THE UNITED STATES, DEFENDING MOBUTU WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, SECRETARY VANCE, ANDREW YOUNG AND OTHERS, BUT HAD REPORTED BACK ACCURATELY THEIR CRITICISMS OF MOBUTU AND HIS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. NGUZA THEN WENT TO THE HAGUE WHERE HIS WIFE WAS GIVING BIRTH, BUT WAS SUMMONED HOME AND ARRESTED. MOBUTU CONFRONTED NGUZA PERSONALLY WITH THE ABSURD CHARGE THAT HE HAD MET MOBUTU'S WIFE IN EUROPE AND TOLD HER ABOUT MOBUTU'S MISTRESSES IN AN EFFORT TO SEDUCE HER. WHEN NGUZA DEMURRED, MOBUTU THREATENED TO SHOOT NGUZA UNLESS HE SHUT UP, SO HE DID. NGUZA KNEW THAT IT WAS REALLY MOBUTU'S INABILITY TO STOMACH THE AMERICAN CRITICISM NGUZA HAD REPORTED ACCURATELY BACK TO HIM, AND THE AMERICAN LEADERS' PRAISE OF NGUZA, WHICH MOBUTU VIEWED INCORRECTLY AS AN EFFORT BY NGUZA TO CURRY FAVOR TO SUPPLANT MOBUTU. NGUZA SAID MOBUTU ISSUED A THIRD, PATENTLY FALSE, VERSION AS THE PUBLIC EXPLANATION OF NGUZA'S FALL AND ARREST -- THAT SHABAN NGUZA SECRETLY BACKED THE SHABA REBELLION.

13. NEW BOOK.

SOLARZ OFFERED TO GET NGUZA'S BOOK PUBLISHED IN THE NITED STATES. NGUZA SAID HIS FIRST BOOK WAS TOO POLEMICAL A DIATRIBE AGAINST MOBUTU. HIS SECOND, ZAIRE'S FUTURE, WAS BETTER, BUT HE HAD MATURED IN EXILE AND HIS THIRD BOOK -- THE ZAIRE OF TODAY, THE CONGO OF THE FUTURE -- WHICH WILL BE PUBLISHED IN FRENCH IN A MONTH BY A BELGIAN COMPANY BETTER REFLECTS CURRENT NEEDS, SAID NGUZA. IT IS THAT BOOK HE WOULD LIKE SOLARZ TO HAVE PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH IN THE U.S. SWAEBE

END OF MESSAGE

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PLEASE PASS TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY ELLIOT ABRAMS
FROM CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SHUM, PK
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
PAKISTAN

1. ~~CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ~~ ASKED THAT THE FOLLOWING
MESSAGE BE PASSED TO HA ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS.

2. BEGIN TEXT: WHILE IN LONDON, IT WAS BROUGHT
TO MY ATTENTION BY BENAZIR BHUTTO THAT FOUR
MEMBERS OF THE PAKISTAN PEOPLES PARTY -- NASSER
BALOACH, ESSA BALOACH, MALIK AYUB AND
SAIFULLAH KHALID -- HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO DEATH
BY A PAKISTANI MILITARY COURT FOR THEIR ALLEGED
INVOLVEMENT IN A 1981 AIRLINE HIJACKING. THEY MAY
BE EXECUTED IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO, IF THEIR
APPEAL IS REJECTED.

I HAVE NO INDEPENDENT INFORMATION ABOUT THESE FOUR
MEN OR THEIR TRIAL, ALTHOUGH I UNDERSTAND THAT
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL IS CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR
CASE. IT IS ALLEGED THAT THESE MEN ARE REALLY
BEING TRIED FOR THEIR POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO THE
PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT. I HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THAT
THE ONLY EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM IS THEIR OWN
CONFESSIONS, OBTAINED UNDER TORTURE.
DOES THE DEPARTMENT HAVE ANY INFORMATION ABOUT
THIS CASE? IN PARTICULAR, DO WE KNOW IF THE
FOUR MEN WERE TORTURED OR OTHERWISE DENIED THEIR
BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS?

IF OUR EMBASSY HAS NOT LOOKED INTO THIS CASE, I
REQUEST IT DO SO IMMEDIATELY. IF WE DO HAVE ANY
INFORMATION THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THESE MEN
HAVE BEEN VIOLATED AND THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN
ACCORDED DUE PROCESS OF LAW, I URGENTLY ASK THAT
WE IMMEDIATELY TAKE UP THEIR CASE WITH THE
APPROPRIATE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. END
TEXT.

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END OF MESSAGE

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INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4408
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2140
RUOKSA/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 1419
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PREL, BU, IT, UR, US
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI ON THE AGCA CASE

REFS: (A) ROME 26532
- (B) ROME 27610

1. (S) SUMMARY. DURING HIS NOVEMBER 9-11 VISIT TO ROME, CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ (D-NEW YORK) ASKED A NUMBER OF PEOPLE FOR THEIR VIEWS ON BULGARIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE PAPAL ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. THE COMMENTS OF FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT, SINCE HE IS SKEPTICAL OF BULGARIAN AND, BY EXTENTION, SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. SOLARZ ALSO SAW SEVERAL U.S. JOURNALISTS, ONE OF WHOM (CLAIRE STERLING) HAD SOME INTERESTING COMMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. (S) ANDREOTTI SKEPTICAL

SOLARZ ASKED ANDREOTTI WHAT THE REACTION WOULD BE IF IN FACT THE BULGARIANS WERE CONVICTED IN COURT OF HAVING INSTIGATED THE PAPAL ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. ANDREOTTI MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN REPLY:

- (A) THE MARTELLA REPORT (REF A) IS MORE CAUTIOUS THAN THE EARLIER REPORT OF PROSECUTOR ALBANO. NEVERTHELESS, IF BULGARIA IS SHOWN TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT, ITALY WILL HAVE TO DRAW THE CONSEQUENCES. FOR THE TIME BEING, ITALY MAINTAINS NORMAL RELATIONS WITH BULGARIA.
- THE AMERICANS WHO TELL AMBASSADOR PETRIGNANI THAT ITALY WANTS A COVER-UP ARE WRONG. ITALY WILL ACCEPT THE RESULTS OF THE TRIAL.

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- (B) THE ALBANO DOCUMENT WAS PUBLISHED IN
 - THE U.S. PRESS BEFORE IT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE
 - ITALIAN AUTHORITIES. THIS CAUSED THE BULGARIANS
 - TO QUESTION THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS. (COMMENT:
 - THE BULGARIANS WERE ALREADY ON THIS LINE, BUT
 - THEY EXPLOITED CLAIRE STERLING'S REVELATIONS.)
 - (C) ANDREOTTI BELIEVES THAT BULGARIAN AIRLINE
 - EMPLOYEE ANTONOV DID KNOW AGCA BUT ONLY FOR
 - THE PURPOSES OF NARCOTICS SMUGGLING. BULGARIA
 - IS CLEARLY CONNECTED WITH DRUG SMUGGLING,
 - SOMETHING NEW TO THE ITALIANS WHO HAD HITHERTO
 - REGARDED BULGARIA AS A TIGHTLY DISCIPLINED
 - AGRARIAN COMMUNIST COUNTRY. NOW THERE IS
 - DOLCE VITA AT MODERN HOTELS IN SOFIA. WITH
 - HIS AIRLINE EMPLOYMENT, ANTONOV WAS WELL-PLACED
 - FOR DRUG SMUGGLING. ANDREOTTI DID NOT BELIEVE
 - THAT THE SOVIETS ARE BEHIND BULGARIA'S NARCOTICS'
 - ACTIVITIES.

- (D) WE MUST ALL WAIT AND SEE, WITH RESPECT TO
 - THE QUESTION WHETHER THE USSR WAS BEHIND
 - BULGARIA, IF IN FACT THE BULGARIANS ARE GUILTY.
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3. (LOU) OTHER ITALIAN COMMENTS

SOLARZ RAISED THE AGCA CASE ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS DURING HIS ROME VISIT. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REACTIONS TO A DETERMINATION OF GUILT ON THE PART OF THE BULGARIANS, ACADEMICIANS MERLINI AND SILVESTRI OF THE ITALIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (IAI) DID NOT EXPECT SIGNIFICANT REACTION: PEOPLE WOULD THINK THE BULGARIAN INVOLVEMENT HORRIBLE, BUT THERE WOULD BE LITTLE TO DO ABOUT IT EXCEPT BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BULGARIA, AS THE UK HAD DONE WITH LIBYA.

4. (C) CLAIRE STERLING'S COMMENTS

CLAIRE STERLING ALSO SAW NO GREAT DIPLOMATIC REACTION AND HERSELF FELT THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE USSR EVEN IF BULGARIA AND HENCE THE USSR WERE GUILTY. SHE FORESAW, ON THE OTHER HAND, SOME PUBLIC REACTION AGAINST THE USSR AND JUDGED THAT, WHILE THE CULTIVATED ELITE WERE FULLY AWARE OF WHAT THE USSR HAD DONE IN THE PAST, THE AGCA CASE WOULD COME AS A REMINDER TO THOSE WHOSE MEMORY SPANS ARE VERY SHORT.

5. (C) WITH RESPECT TO WHAT HAPPENS NEXT, STERLING SAID THERE WERE TWO FORCES AT WORK NOW WITHIN THE ITALIAN SYSTEM: THOSE WHO WANT A MAJOR TRIAL WITH

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, PREL, BU, IT, UR, US

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI ON THE AGCA CASE

THE CONSEQUENCES FALLING WHERE THEY WILL, AND THOSE IN FAVOR OF REMANDING THE TRIAL TO SOME PROVINCIAL VENUE UNDER AN INEXPERIENCED JUDGE. SHE SAID ANDREOTTI WAS IN FAVOR OF THE LATTER COURSE. WITHIN THE VATICAN, CASAROLI AND MANY OTHER KEY FIGURES ARE IN FAVOR OF DAMPING DOWN THE ISSUE, BUT THE POPE HIMSELF HAS MADE HIS VIEW CLEAR THAT JUSTICE SHOULD BE DONE. (COMMENT: STERLING SEEMS TO HAVE IT WRONG ON THE POSSIBLE USE OF A PROVINCIAL COURT (SEE REF B), BUT RIGHT ON THE POINT OF SUBSTANCE: THE DECISION ON WHICH COURT WILL TRY THE

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BULGARIANS HAS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS.)

6. (S) WITH RESPECT TO THE FACTS, STERLING CITED A LARGE NUMBER OF CIRCUMSTANCES ADDING UP TO A CLEAR CASE AGAINST THE BULGARIANS:

- ONE EXAMPLE WAS THE BULGARIAN FALSIFICATION OF CELENK'S ENTRY AND EXIT DATES INTO BULGARIA, WHICH MARTELLA HAD OBTAINED VIA THE GERMAN POLICE FROM CELENK'S PASSPORT.
- ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE VALIDITY OF AGCA'S TESTIMONY WAS HIS SUGGESTION THAT SINCE THERE ARE NO DIAL TELEPHONES BETWEEN BULGARIA AND TURKEY, AND HE, AGCA HAD CALLED CELENK REPEATEDLY FROM A PAY PHONE NEAR THE HOTEL WHERE HE WAS STAYING, MARTELLA MIGHT WANT TO CHECK OUT THAT PAY PHONE. DURING HIS VISIT TO BULGARIA, MARTELLA DID SO, RECEIVED THE BULGARIAN PHONE RECORDS AND THEY CHECKED WITH WHAT AGCA HAD SAID.

7. (C) STERLING BELIEVED THAT AGCA'S INACCURATE TESTIMONY HAD BEEN PART OF A STRATEGY AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE PLOTTERS BEFORE THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. AGCA TURNED DOWN AN APPEAL ATTEMPT BECAUSE HE EXPECTED THAT AN ESCAPE WAS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING ORGANIZED AND HE DID NOT WANT TO BE MOVED FROM THE PRISON WHERE HE WAS. WHEN NO MOVE HAD BEEN MADE TO SPRING HIM, HOWEVER, HE REALIZED THAT HIS ONLY CHANCE NOT TO SPEND THE REST OF HIS LIFE IN PRISON WAS A PRESIDENTIAL PARDON, AND THE FIRST STEP TOWARD THAT END WAS TO COME CLEAN. (COMMENT: THE MARTELLA DOCUMENT CONTAINS MATERIAL ON THIS LINE OF REASONING.)

8. (U) SEPTTEL REPORTS OTHER PARTS OF THE ANDREOTTI CONVERSATION.

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